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A Query into the Unification of Currencies in South East Asia 
 
 
Introduction 
 Against the backdrop of an epochal financial architecture and the bold efforts at 
integrating differing economies in the European zone, the author of this paper attempts an 
empirical perusal into the unification of currencies among the 10 member states of the 
Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN).  This query comes at a particularly 
auspicious junction due to the convergence of 3 compelling series of events that have transpired 
in the recent years; namely, the attainment of a holistic ASEAN, the ever increasing international 
capital mobility and the evolutionary thinking among monetary economists on the narrowed 
choices of an appropriate exchange rate regime. 
 Since the inception of ASEAN in 1967, the 4 founding member nations (Indonesia, 
Philippines, Malaysia, and Thailand) envisioned a geographic region, which shared a common 
destiny.      In the midst of social and political tumults, the aforesaid vision propounded on a 
politically harmonious, economically prosperous and an outward looking association of countries.  
On 16th December 1998, the dream of full envelopment of all 10 countries within ASEAN finally 
came into fruition with the entry of the Kingdom of Cambodia.  Thereafter, ASEAN has been 
particularly embroiled in ensuring the realization of an economically prosperous region.     
 In juxtapose to ASEAN’s gradual solidity, an economic phenomenon has pervasively 
extended its presence to the international financial scene.  The growth and enmeshment of equity 
markets in various developed and emerging countries have been well documented.1 This ongoing 
phenomenon, which emanated from the USA, has riveted the world with the belief that these 
markets are keys toward the efficient allocation of financial resources.  Through the pursuit of 
maximization of shareholder wealth, companies, which showed promise in terms of economic  
 
 
1.  Numerous studies have pointed out the ever-closer correlation between global equity markets.  However, this remains to be clearly established. 
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growth and profitability, have been given favorable chances for further commercial expansion. 
This in turn has bred more competition towards the provision of better quality of products and 
services, with a wider purview of offerings at affordable prices.  Hence, the cross border capital 
flows have, supposedly, been intended for the optimization of financial capital returns. 
 The much-lauded capital mobility exhibited staccato trends in the late 1990s.  Previous 
inundation of financial capital from developed to emerging markets took a sudden reversal with 
the Thai Baht debacle.  This result was a domino like effect that spread from South East Asia to 
Korea, Russia and Brazil within a span of one year.  In hindsight, economists started advocating 
a slew of postulates on the possible causes of such economic catastrophes, the corresponding 
ramifications on the international financial architecture and the possible policies that may 
minimize future currency and financial crises.  Out of this sea of policy recommendations came 
the near concurrence from among macroeconomists that the nature of a country’s exchange rate 
regime  (which interacted with other economic policies of respective governments) played an 
immanent role in the internal and external economic stability of a country.  Moreover, within the 
context of international capital mobility, there was widespread belief that the choice of exchange 
rate regime be narrowed down to a preference between a hard peg and a totally flexible one.       
 The centripetal movement of the 3 aforementioned factors (the holistic formation of 
ASEAN, the mobility of capital, and near consensus on the severely narrowed options of 
exchange rate regimes) has made the concept of unifying ASEAN currencies more intellectually 
provocative.  This has further been hinged upon the, arguably, successful launch of the Euro. 
 
Objective 
 
 Based on the texts of ASEAN agreements through the years, one can reasonably infer the 
resoluteness of the organization in achieving one common economic market. This has further 
been extended to include ASEAN’s projection as a unified bloc to the international community, 
and not a mere loose group of nations under an umbrella organization.  Hence, the author tries to  
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examine whether current economic conditions can lead to the unification of currencies in the 
long run, which ought to assist ASEAN in further sealing its cohesive ambitions. In doing so, it 
is imperative to first learn if the region constitutes an optimum currency area. 
 
Scope and Limitations         
 This paper does not attempt to comprehensively cover the entire span of inquest on the 
possible unification of ASEAN currencies.  Bereft of the legal framework, political and cultural 
considerations, the author of this paper simply endeavored to empirically determine the validity 
of such an inquest.  To further substantiate the study, the author also attempted to draw a certain 
degree of analogy between ASEAN and the historical development of the Euro.  As was 
mentioned, upon closer examination of the transcripts from the series of ASEAN accords, the 
move towards one common economic market becomes apparent. This has subsequently led the 
author to ruminate on whether a currency union, within the context of existing theories regarding 
optimum currency areas, can lend a further contributory role towards a lasting ASEAN common 
market. 
 The author of this paper also wishes to accentuate that the purview of his endeavor aims 
to instigate a succession of future researches that will more thoroughly unearth the feasibility of 
such a topic.  By this is meant that, the author willfully left out the analysis on each member 
country’s specific characteristics and on its decision to adopt certain foreign exchange rate 
regimes, which are deemed to be justifications for the respective economic policies that they 
have chosen.2      
 
 
2.  According to macroeconomists, a country’s exchange rate regime largely depends on its specific characteristics, the environment in which it is 
in and on the type of economic policies that it chooses to adopt.  
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The Need for One Currency  
 ASEAN was formally conceived in 1967.  The 4 founding member nations (Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand) were not coy about their promulgation of a region steadfast 
in political stability, regional development and enhanced complementation with each other.  This 
vision was subsequently enhanced by accords that aimed to gradually integrate the entire South 
East Asian region.  The Concord of 1976 put forward another objective on the need to develop a 
sense of regional identity.  By 1992 a Common Effective Preferential Tariff Scheme was set in 
place.  Its main aim was to build a preferential trading arrangement to lay groundwork for a free 
trade area (ASEAN Free Trade Area or AFTA) with the barest of tariffs ranging from 0-5 % on 
agreed product lines.  In principle, this tariff range would be implemented by 2003. 3  On the 
realization of the acceptance of the last prospective member , the Kingdom of Cambodia (1998), 
into the association, a certain sense of triumph was felt.  After 21 years, the dream of unifying all 
10 countries under one regional association was finally attained. 
 The ASEAN 2020 Vision and the Hanoi Action Plan of 1998 aimed a slew of objectives 
that ranged the spectrum from a politically stable region to a highly competitive and outward 
looking economic zone. Emphasis is given on the free flow of goods, services, investments and 
capital.  In addition, equitable economic development and the reduction of poverty become 
paramount objectives that need to be addressed in order to ensure successful integration.  
Furthermore, it should be noted that the determination of ASEAN in its pursuit for integration 
could be exhibited through the frequency of its meetings at ministerial levels.4          
 ASEAN’s aspirations do not defy economic logic.  First of all, the signs of times indicate 
the thrust of region wide economic development as a subset of international economic 
integration.  Europe’s initial success with the launch of the Euro may have captivated the other 
geographic regions to further consolidate.  Hence, the responses of South American, African and  
 
 
3. A more detailed explanation of the ASEAN accords can be found on the ASEAN web site (www.asean.com) 
4.  The term integration does not only cover the economic aspect of the region, it encompasses the totality of the region (political, socio-cultural, 
and economic)   
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Middle Eastern countries to examine closer economic arrangements with each other.  Second, by 
jointly developing the South East Asian region the countries have a stronger chance of meeting 
the emerging economic prowess of the People’s Republic of China ad India (due to political 
sensitivities, this is not officially espoused). Thirdly, development within the region may mean 
that ASEAN members can also rely on regional growth to somewhat provide an alternative to the 
current major export markets that most of the countries rely to for international trade – USA, 
Japan, and Europe. 
 In view of these latest developments, the theory of optimum currency areas is seriously 
being considered outside the enclave of the academia.  While it is true that a group of economists 
insist that the economic union of a region may not necessarily lead to monetary or currency 
integration, the opposite contention may also be viable.  A common market can lead to future 
monetary union because it makes possible the free flow of movement of capital and labor from 
one area of a region to another.  This allows for the further efficient allocation of resources 
within the zone.  Thereby, increasing the total social welfare.  This postulate has been supported 
by empirical studies conducted by Rose and Engel (2000). 
 The aforementioned researchers (Rose and Engel) used dis-aggregated international data 
and concluded that currency unions are more open and specialized than non-currency union 
countries of comparable size.  They also discovered that trade between members of a currency 
union was much higher than trade between comparable countries by a factor of over 3.  This 
stance was further made appealing with the added observation that volatility of exchange rates is 
lower for members of currency unions than for countries with independent currencies. 
               Even though Rose and Engel’s study augurs well for regions to seriously complement 
their planned regional integration, caution must be taken on the matter.  Rose and Engel’s study 
did not consider the causality flows from economic integration to the currency union.   
Furthermore, nations have to seriously consider the repercussions of giving up monetary policy  
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as a tool to maintain external and internal equilibrium.  The following sections will further try to 
dissect the anatomy of the issue. 
 
A Précis of Lessons Learned from the Asian Crisis 
 
 The recently concluded ASEAN crisis raised awareness among ASEAN states, as well as 
other Asian economies, of the need to enhance monetary cooperation on a region wide scale.  
The herd-like behavior exhibited by investors brought about the ex post cognizance that 
investors may have a tendency to react cursorily when a country in the region experiences 
macroeconomic difficulties.  According to Goldstein (1998), the beginning of a currency crisis 
instigates a “wake up” phenomenon wherein investors will be compelled to closely reassess 
other countries to try to determine a similarity with the afflicted economy.  More often, due to 
the portfolio managers’ lack of information, they are compelled to assume the worst. 
 To briefly recapitulate the inception of the Asian crisis, when Thailand’s economy first 
showed signs of slowing down a gradual perception was built on the over valuation of the Baht.  
Investors and currency traders ascribed the possible misalignment of the currency due to the 
activities of the monetary authority; which was trying to limit the fluctuation of the Baht against 
the currency of its largest export market – the USA.  Hence, when the US Dollar gradually 
strengthened against the Yen, the Thai Baht was also forced to follow the trend.5  The subsequent 
burst of the bubble in Thailand was compounded with the insufficient disclosure  of information 
by the government  on the extent of the economic woes of the country.  Understandably, 
investors and creditors assumed a worst-case scenario predominated by at tightening of credit 
and the devaluation of the currency.  Despite the concerted efforts of the Central Bank of 
Thailand and other central banks in the region, the selling pressure on the currency persisted.   
 
5.  The US dollar started to experience great volatility against the Yen since the early 1990s (known to the Japanese as the period of the super 
Endaka).  This made the Thai Baht appreciate in real terms due to interest rate differentials. 
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Soon Indonesia, Philippines and Malaysia experienced their share of massive capital 
withdrawals; which was hinged on the respective currencies’ correlative movement with the US 
Dollar and shared interests in the USA as a major export market. 
 Numerous economists have studied the cited concert of investor and creditor withdrawals 
with great fervor.  This is not due to the peculiarity of the crisis (the South American experience 
bears a certain degree of semblance) but in connection with the previous acclaim that a good 
number of the afflicted economies in the Asian region (not only in ASEAN) were viewed as 
paragons of contemporary economic success. It seemed slightly incomprehensible how such 
regional accomplishments could marginalize on the illusory. 
 A study made by Glick and Rose (1998) tried to explain the contagion effect of the 
currency crisis.  They postulated that once Thailand was forced to float the Baht, its main trade 
competitors (Malaysia, Philippines, and Indonesia) had to be attacked by speculators.  Otherwise, 
these economies would be relegated to an economically disadvantageous state.  Hence, currency 
crises tend to follow international patterns of trade.  The authors indicated that there was a 
tendency for countries that were compelled to devalue their currencies to experience recession.  
These resultant recessions usually pave the way to sharp reduction in imports, which then 
affected another county’s exports. 
 In another paper by Berg and Patillo (1999), the authors strove to authenticate more 
concrete measures aimed at predicting currency crises.  They analyzed the 3 models formulated 
by: Sachs, Tornell and Velasco, Frankel and Rose’s Probit model, and Keminsky, Lizardo and 
Reinhart.  The outcome of the study was inconclusive in the sense that no model was able to 
soundly predict a currency crisis (although the model of Keminisky, Lizardo and Reinhart came 
closest).  However, the authors did volunteer that the 3 models statistically seemed to indicate 
that the probability of a currency crisis increased with the presence of the following variables: 
high domestic credit growth, an over valued exchange rate and a high ratio of M2 reserves. 
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It is a near dictum among macroeconomists that the type of exchange rate regime selected 
by a country should complement its particular economic objectives.6   Meaning, a government 
that is inclined to favor populist measures may experience considerable challenges in 
maintaining a fixed rate regime.  Likewise, an economy with substantial trade interests with 
another country may be reluctant to merely let the volatility of bilateral exchange rates be 
determined by market forces.  Hence, a country’s decision on its foreign exchange rate system is 
predicated on the desired levels of inflation and unemployment, in conjunction with the external 
balances of the economy. Yet, despite the conceptual acknowledgement of the circumstances in 
which a country may favor a particular exchange rate regime, a flurry of debates occurred in the 
direct aftermath of the Asian crisis on the appropriate regime that may be more resilient to future 
economic and currency crises.7   
 The issue of exchange rate arrangements must be contextualized within its proper 
paradigm. Nowadays, international and monetary transactions are being increasingly integrated.  
Such is the stage of this evolution that, in the current environs, international private capital flows 
finance substantial current account imbalances.  This has been brought about by the nature of the 
financial environment comprising of: low transaction costs as a result of the information and 
technology revolution, the rapid creation of financial products and countries’ liberalization of 
their capital accounts in order to take advantage of a larger pool of financial wherewithal. 
Despite the various accolade showered on the virtues of capital flows facilitating the 
development of emerging economies, a caveat lies in place – the potential for a quick reversal of 
capital flows.  In ASEAN’s case IMF economist Michael Mussa  (Mussa et al 2000) also 
propounded that currencies are particularly vulnerable to swings in capital flows and exchange  
 
 
6.  The lessons amalgamated from the Asian crisis are expansive. Yet, this paper gives emphasis on exchange rates and a few other variables 
related to the topic of the paper. 
7. Jeffery Frankel (2000) was more skeptical on this moot point by questioning, “ would any exchange rate have prevented the recent economic 
crisis in emerging markets?”. Similarly, Mussa (2000) proclaimed that, “the single most important conclusion of our analysis is that there is no 
single exchange rate regime that is best for all countries, at all times, in all circumstances…”      
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rates between the 3 international currencies – the US Dollar, Yen and the Euro.            
 Mussa’s stance on the behavior of the major currencies was supported by the purport of 
the chief executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, David Yam (1997). The volatility of 
the said exchange rates (most especially the US Dollar vis a vis the Yen) placed the Balance of 
Payment figures of some ASEAN countries under considerable duress.  The currencies that were 
linked to the US Dollar, either explicitly or implicitly, where placed in a bind whenever the US 
Dollar appreciated against the Yen; as some ASEAN countries were also competing (directly or 
indirectly) with the Japanese and other Asian economies for their exports to the US market.  
With the unlikelihood of an accord between the countries of the major currencies to keep the 
volatility to a minimum, it was hinted by Mussa that small economies have to incorporate this 
factor when selecting an appropriate exchange rate regime.8   Furthermore, it was suggested that 
middle range exchange rate regimes (i.e. crawling pegs, adjustable pegs, etc) may not have the 
corresponding credibility compared to the 2 extreme rate regimes- the pegged and floating rates. 
 The near consensus, which was fervently questioned by Frankel, was that only extreme 
forms of exchange rate regimes (i.e. fixed and floating rates) may be sustainable in the current 
environment was derived from the issue of monetary authorities’ maintenance of credibility.  
Market forces tend to formulate currency valuations and inflationary expectations with the 
available government policy pronouncements and actions.  Prior to the Asian crisis, the middle 
rate exchange rate regimes (managed floating and crawling pegs) provided the convenience of 
limited exchange rate volatility under normal times.  It was later learned that the regimes 
promoted a perilous degree of complacency against real foreign exchange risks that suddenly 
mushroomed in the Asian crisis.   In the midst of the debacle, the market forces could not easily 
decipher the exact policy stance of the governments as to the definitive exchange rate levels to 
adopt.  Hence, an overreaction of the markets followed. 
 
8.  The three major economies tend to prioritize domestic concerns over external equilibrium.     
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 There are many critics of the fixed exchange rate regime.  Countries that are well 
integrated into the financial markets (e.g. Malaysia and Singapore) may find that it lacks the 
necessary flexibility to defend their currency when it is under speculative attack.9 Yet, a 
government, due to specific economic objectives, may still chose to adopt this mode. However, 
the successful operation of a pegged rate system requires that monetary policy be geared towards 
the attainment of exchange rate objectives.  This also means that banks should be held at higher 
prudential standards, disenabling the government to be the lender of last resort.  Furthermore, the 
strict enforcement of hedging against foreign borrowings is a must (Mckinnon 2000). 
 In contrast to the fixed exchange rate system, there have been persuasive arguments for 
the adoption of a flexible exchange rate regime.  Advocates have argued that, under normal 
situations, it is paramount that the system should be allowed to float.  This enables borrowers, 
lenders, and traders engaged in international transactions to assume full foreign exchange rate 
risks.10 Moreover, a flexible rate system is favorable for countries that are well integrated in the 
global capital markets as it allows the government more leeway to respond to speculative attacks.  
A caveat cited by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) and Rajan (1999) is that the flexible rate system 
has a tendency to lead towards greater volatility of exchange rates in the short term.     
  In summary, the lessons learned from the Asian Crisis are numerous. The importance of 
having complementary economic policies and communicating them in a transparent fashion to 
the public is paramount.  The adoption of a pegged exchange rate system, in order to stabilize the 
level of trade between countries, can only be sustained if the financial system has enough 
safeguard measures against excessive leverage and foreign exchange exposure of public, private 
and domestic household sectors.  Since a pegged system tends to give a false sense of security  
against foreign exchange rate risk, it is also incumbent upon the governments to ensure that  
 
9. Singapore was minimally affected by the Asian Crisis because it pegged its exchange rate to a basket of currencies. The credibility of its 
monetary authority was also left intact.  
10.  A totally benign neglect of a floating rate system will also not be in the interest of maintaining domestic equilibrium.  Foreign exchange 
markets when left alone may not always reflect economic fundamentals.  Subsequently, these large protracted deviations in the value of the 
currency from its long run equilibrium will have dire economic consequences.   
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foreign exchange exposure is appropriately insulated through hedging.  In addition, the 
liberalization of capital accounts should be done gradually with the longer-term assets being 
liberalized first.  But even then, with the sophistry of financial instruments currently available in 
the international financial environment, it would be extremely challenging to delineate long term 
flows from those of a short term nature.      
 Studies conducted by Mussa (Musa et al 2000) and Rajan (1999) indicated that pegging 
against a singular currency would expose some of the ASEAN countries to substantial 
fluctuation against other currencies (i.e. the US Dollar in juxtapose with the Yen or Euro). Hence, 
if some ASEAN countries are to be pegged to the Dollar and if the Dollar appreciates, these 
countries may be exposed to inflationary pressures due to its trade with Japan or the European 
Union.  The same ASEAN countries might also have to suffer indirect or direct competition 
against the Japanese products exported to the USA.11 It is in this light that currency basket pegs 
are heavily recommended for ASEAN countries. 
 As was stated in an earlier paragraph, the need for formal monetary cooperation among 
ASEAN has very recently been brought to the fore.   While a form of informal coordination of 
exchange rates may have existed prior to the crisis (there was an informal de facto pegging of 
exchange rates to the Dollar), a more formal consensus among the behavior of exchange rate 
regimes should be allowed in order to preclude competitive devaluation.   The currency basket 
peg cited by Rajan and Hoontrakul’s “triangular peg” (1998) aim to fix the value of ASEAN 
currencies against a weighted value of the major currencies.  This not only addresses the issue of 
possible competitive currency devaluations, but it also incorporates the volatility of the major 
exchange rates against each other. Furthermore, the 3 statistically germane variables cited by 
Berg and Patillo (high domestic credit growth, an overvalued exchange rate and a high ratio of  
 
11.  Most ASEAN products do not compete directly with Japanese goods because of perceived differences in quality levels and targeted market 
segments. However, the products assembled from transnational companies located in the South East Asia region and exported to the USA are  of 
comparable quality wit the Japanese.    
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M2 reserves) as strong predictors of currency crises can be collectively monitored and 
proactively minimmzed.12 Unsurprisingly, both Rajan and Hoontrakul cited that the 
aforementioned option could be a move towards a monetary union in the long term perspective.   
This heightens the possibility of ASEAN solidifying its regional trade pact.   
 
Promotion of Macroeconomic Stability in the Region  
 
 One of the more compelling rationales for the call for one currency for the long-term 
prospect of ASEAN is the promise of a more stable macroeconomic environment.   This is made 
possible through a central monetary authority (as a result of the currency union), which may be 
able to implement monetary control more efficaciously than individual national central banks.  A 
disciplined, region wide monetary stance can then lead to greater fiscal discipline.   Legions of 
macroeconomic text-books attest to the boon of such an environment.  Moreover, the total 
elimination of foreign exchange risks of countries within the region can facilitate further export 
and import flows.  This can sustain or revitalize economic development among countries 
concerned.  Inflationary pressures that emanate from volatility of currencies will also be 
drastically minimized. In turn, this should lower interest rates and augur to a lesser cost of capital 
that should lead to a boost in investments in the region.  
 A currency integration also complements economic integration (the realization of the 
vision of ASEAN 2020). With the notion of a free market allowed to operate in a wider 
geographic area, businesses will situate themselves in places where they can gain competitive 
advantages (the provisions for greater labor mobility and capital resources movement have also 
been incorporated within the ASEAN 2020 Plan).  Production costs will decrease as a result of  
 
 
12.  This mode of cooperation cohesively blends with one of ASEAN’s principles on the sprit of constructive engagement.  
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more freedom in trade, economies of scale, and optional choices for investment.  This not only 
leads to more gains and economic growth, but to enhanced consumer welfare, as well.         
  
Capital Market Reforms 
 The presence of one currency would putatively lead to capital market reforms, in order to 
maximize the full economic benefits that may befall on the whole region.  While the current state 
of ASEAN capital markets is on its, relatively, infantile stage (with the notable exception of 
Singapore, which has one of the biggest capital markets in Asia) economic and currency 
integrations are meant to unravel improvements in the regional financial markets.  The 
elimination of intra-regional exchange rate risks should lead to consolidation of financial markets.  
The effects of best practices system should also bolster regional savings, which can be used for 
further investments and commercial expansion.  The combined size of the integrated financial 
markets will also insulate, to a certain degree, the region from central external shocks.  Thereby, 
allowing the central monetary authority more control over its monetary policy at the international 
level.         
 Conceptually, this free flow of capital mobility also renders the governments financing of 
deficits easier.  According to Masson and Taylor (1993), this introduces another degree of 
freedom for governments within the region to finance their fiscal budgets. However, the 
respective countries will no longer have the same captive markets (previously, their domestic 
markets) for their debts. 
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Literature Review of the Optimum Currency Areas       
 
 Robert Mundell (1961) is the internationally recognized harbinger of the theory of 
optimum currency area, in contemporary times.  He defined such an area to be an economic unit 
comprised of regions affected symmetrically by disturbances and between which labor and other 
factors flowed freely.  More specifically, he expounded that when regions within a prescribed 
area experience that same shocks there existed no overt advantage in the existence of relative 
price differentials. In places where a higher level of unemployment resided, Mundell opined that 
the free movement of labor towards regions experiencing higher economic growth would result.  
With the free movement of labor (on the assumption that prices are generally elastic), the 
adjustment of exchange rates as a means of restoring external competitiveness and eliminating 
external balances becomes obviated.  Moreover, the movement of labor from regions of high 
unemployment to areas of low unemployment is supposed to bring about a convergence of wages 
and other related costs. Only when savings in transaction costs exceeded the rise in adjustment 
costs did the merging of two countries to share one common currency become economically 
justified.  
 In order for an optimum currency area to take effect, other noted economists gave 
cognizance to the need for other factors (other than movement of free labor) to be present 
(Mckinnon in 1963 and Kenen in 1969).  These are: the openness and size of the economy, the 
degree of commodity diversification, price and wage flexibility, the similarity in experiences of 
economic shocks, and the free movement of capital.              
 The more open the economy, and the smaller its size, the more it is likely to be a 
candidate for an optimum currency area.  An open and small economy tends to imbue the 
exogenous variables of its much larger trading partners.   Hence, a country like the Philippines 
will experience an import of inflationary bias if the USA decides to increase its interest rates to  
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address its domestic situation.  In order for the Philippines to stem the outflow of capital, it may 
have to raise its nominal interest rates, as well, even though its inflation rate is at a manageable 
level.  The effect of such a policy will unnecessarily restrict the growth of the Philippine 
economy.  A small country’s imbrue of exogenous variables will then mitigate the full effects of 
its domestic monetary policy. 
 A country with a certain degree of commodity diversification is also viewed as a better 
candidate to an optimum currency area.  The rationale behind this lies in the level of insulation 
that a country may provide against a variety of economic shocks. An example is when a country 
that heavily depends on its agricultural products for its exports experiences a massive downtrend 
in foreign exchange earnings due to a slump in international prices of basic commodities.  In the 
event that there is a prolongation of low international prices of commodities, this may force an 
adjustment in relative prices via adjustment in the exchange rate.  The more frequent the 
adjustments, the more unstable an economy may become. 
      The issue of wage and price flexibility may diminish the need for exchange rate 
adjustments.  With the presence of wage and price flexibility between regions, the likelihood of 
economic imbalances associated with unemployment in one region and inflation in another can 
be significantly mitigated.  In this regard, an area that experiences greater economic development 
over other areas will experience inflow of labor movement from economically underprivileged 
areas.  The law of supply and demand will then prevail with a lowering of wage prices and 
unemployment in the poorer regions and an increase in wage prices and employment in the more 
affluent regions.  The cited economic scenario, in theory, will not require an adjustment of 
exchange rates. 
 Similarity in experiences of economic shocks, even though its effects may seem subtle, 
can have a significant impact on a unified currency area.  This criterion is usually ascribed to the  
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production structures of countries in a region.  The more similar the production structure of 
countries, the more likely it will possess akin terms of trade shocks.  With this set up, the 
effectiveness of exchange rate adjustments may be negated, most especially if countries in a 
region are trade dependent on each other. 
 The papers by Frankel (1993), Eichengreen (1992), Kennen (1969), Krugman (1993) 
point to the assertion that the more intense the trade relation between two countries, the more 
beneficial it will be for monetary integration.  This is because the intensity of trade is believed to 
affect the nature of business cycles of each concerned country.  Closer international trade is 
believed to result in countries becoming more specialized in the production of goods in which 
they have a competitive advantage.  This then leads to tighter correlation in business cycles.  
Moreover, it must be noted that membership in a regional trading arrangement is also believed to 
be strongly associated with more intense trade activity. 
 Capital mobility also has its special role in a unified currency area.  In theory, high 
mobility of financial capital enables the transfer of capital flow from one region to another.  This 
movement may be used as a source to finance differences between national savings and 
investment.  Often times, there are numerous investment opportunities in less developed regions 
that give higher returns (but which also carry higher risk premiums).                                 
 As the years progressed, numerous studies were made on the theory of optimum currency 
area.13 Based on the experiences of actual currency unions, it has been postulated that other 
criteria may also propel the warrant for a currency union.  Countries with a dire need to import 
strong monetary stability are usually besieged with a historical baggage of lack of credibility on 
its monetary authorities. This is the case for countries with a series of inflationary troubles that 
came about as a result of uncontrolled government spending.   
 
13. IMF Financial Statistics Yearbook 2000 makes particular mention of the following currency union arrangements: the Euro Area, Central 
African Economic Monetary Community, West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), and the East Caribbean Community 
(ECCM).    
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 Notwithstanding the 4 pillars of a currency area (free movement of labor, goods and 
services, capital and synchronization of economic cycles), the issue of free movement of 
economic variables may not always be pragmatically present.  As with the case of labor 
movement, it may not be socially expedient for the unemployed of one region to transfer to 
another region experiencing faster economic growth.  European economists have noted this and 
have attributed such a phenomenon to cultural impediments, institutional peculiarities, 
differences in industry structure and skills of the labor force of countries within a region. 
Obviously, with the slight hamper of free movement of economic factors, one region may end up 
growing faster that another area.  In another situation, wherein regional specialization in goods is 
no longer in demand, there may not be enough economic incentives for productive investment.         
In the event that labor and investment eventually move out of the area, it is quite doubtful that 
the optimum currency area, by itself, will lead to an expedient diminishment of 
underdevelopment.  If this lingers, it may cause strains in how monetary policy is exercised in 
the whole currency area. To remedy such an eventuality, the issue of fiscal transfers comes into 
play. 
 The policy of fiscal transfer, or re-distributive policy, aims to accelerate productivity 
gains in economically “un-favored” regions.  This policy is meant to minimize the social and 
political pressures that may arise from less developed regions to break away from a currency 
union area.  14 It is likely to be more important the less responsive migration is to differences in 
regional wage and unemployment.  But as regards to this concept, the capacity of less developed 
regions to avail of fiscal transfer should be prudently tempered by the present value of taxes it 
will be able to collect within a given time period.  Otherwise, such transfers may discourage 
factors of production, which are no longer competitive, from moving out of the region.  In effect, 
this can distort economic incentives. 
 The theory of optimum currency area is generally bifurcated into 2 areas of thought.  The  
 
14.  Sala-I-Martin and Sachs  (1992) showed the importance of the transfer system in addressing economically depressed regions in the USA.  
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first school of thought delves on the necessity of economic convergence of the aforementioned 
criteria. This arises from the belief that monetary integration will not be sustainable unless it is 
preceded by general economic integration.  Otherwise, the whole currency region may be 
burdened by economic and social tensions.  On the other hand, the second school of thought 
ardently abides by the theory that closer economic and monetary integration is likely to lead to 
an increased economic convergence.  The resulting free movement of goods and other economic 
variables will lead to an equalization of factor prices and per capita output.     
        
Roles of a Central Monetary Authority and Fiscal policy  
  
 The roles of a central monetary authority and fiscal policy were not integrally part of the 
optimum currency area in its early stages of conceptualization.  However, their roles are now 
widely recognized as indispensable towards the sustainability of such an economic arrangement.  
As regards to a central monetary authority, its mandate of prioritizing price stability should be 
unequivocal.  Its dependence from political influence is such that its reputation is left 
unblemished at al times.  Otherwise, lack of credibility can lead to the very antithesis of 
macroeconomic stability, which increases the likelihood of financial crisis setting in.  When it is 
apparent that the central monetary authority cannot commit itself to price stability, the private 
sector will recognize this and infuse inflation into its expectations that labor would demand 
higher wage settlements and investors in government bonds would demand higher interest rates 
to compensate for expected inflation. A caveat here is that since the central monetary authority’s 
role is prioritizing internal equilibrium, expectations of currency volatility against other 
currencies (outside the area) can be expected to be quite high.    Moreover, when some countries  
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in the region progress faster than the others, a conflict of interest may arise when it comes to 
setting interest rate policies.                    
 The fiscal policies of countries in a currency area zone should also be closely monitored. 
A large country or a group of countries that undertake lax fiscal spending will usually affect the 
whole currency area in the form of an outflow of savings. The over issuance of government debt 
will lead to a rise in current account deficits.  Since excessive government spending will lead to a 
downgrade in its sovereign rating, and it cannot print money, a throng of expectations from the 
investment community will find the government’s position to be unsustainable.  This means that 
at one time or another there will be a correction, a scenario that any investor does not cherish 
being caught in.  Once this happens the central monetary authority might be compelled to hike 
the interest rates to stem the outflow of capital.  This will then affect the overall economic 
growth and investment prospects of the whole currency area. 
 
Benefits of an Optimum Currency Area      
 
 The most overt benefit that can accrue to countries in a unified currency zone is related to 
the magnitude of trade increase after the unification.  The deletion of foreign exchange risks 
within a region, the diminishment of information and transaction costs, and the benefits of price 
stability should lead to pronounced increase in intra-industry trade.  In addition, Eichengreen 
(1991) stressed that commodity prices are expected to move closely together due to the 
effacement of border taxes and other financial determinants of share prices should also converge. 
Subsequently, enhancement and prolongation of intra-industry trade leads to industry 
specialization among countries in a currency zone.15 
 A study by Frankel and Rose (2000) provided statistical evidence that currency unions 
stimulate trade.  From a data set of 200 countries, they estimated that trade between countries  
 
15.  It must be noted that a currency union may also lead to inter industry trade (trade within the industry), which may not result in the 
specialization of industries in different countries.         
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belonging to a currency union more than tripled.  More specifically, an approximation that for 
every 1% increase in trade (relative to GDP), there is a rise in income per capita by 1/3 of 1% 
over twenty years.  Hence, the results of their study on currency unions were: a currency union 
promotes bilateral trade, it promotes overall openness (with no evidence that the increase of trade 
has come at the expense of non-member countries) and it also increases output.  However, the 
researchers were also quick to qualify their findings. 
 The conclusiveness of their empirical analysis hinted that it mattered with whom one 
country enters a trade pact with another.  Hence, it was most probable that members of a 
currency union should be composed of natural trading partners by virtue of size, proximity and 
other related factors.   The researchers also accentuated that their studies did not cover the length 
of time in which the countries in the currency zones were able to reap the aforementioned trade 
benefits.    
 A currency union also has incalculable potential in harnessing internal and external economic 
competitiveness.  The purported transparency of intra-regional monetary policy coordination (in 
terms of the determination of intra-regional core interest rate in juxtapose with a certain degree 
of intra-regional fiscal policy coordination) should provide for the basic free market tenets that 
will redound to the maximization of economic gains at a microeconomic level.  This simply 
means that business corporations will be forced to compete more aggressively, leaving the most 
financially viable ones to outwardly project their competitiveness outside the currency area.    
 The complete elimination of trade barriers and minimization of transaction costs will also 
provide economic enticements for foreign direct investment.  In ASEAN’s case, the concept of 
one price spread out among 10 countries with a combined current population of approximately 
500M people and an agglomerated GDP of US $600 B (December 1999 figures) can actually 
serve to provide a viable recourse to the Chinese and Indian markets.  With the exception of a  
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few Southeast Asian countries, the rest currently have a savings rate that may not be enough to 
fast forward the locomotive engine of growth. Hence the economic model of temporary reliance 
on foreign investments may be a more feasible approach.  Furthermore, among the slew of 
economic benefits that foreign direct investors may bring: management skills, technical know 
how, and the multiplier effect from the jobs generated may, arguably, be the most important. 
Costs of the Optimum Currency Area 
 Much extol has been meted about the virtues of an optimum currency area that it may 
behoove the uninitiated to eagerly vouch for membership in a currency club.  In all actuality, if a 
country does not have the necessary institutions, systems, and sustainable political will to 
complement the sharing of a currency with other countries then its membership in such a clique 
may not be prolonged (this will also threaten the stability of the entire currency zone). 16 
Membership in a currency area will immediately require the complete nullification of its own 
independent monetary policy. 
      The loss of monetary independence is a very serious macroeconomic issue. It severely 
constrains the degree of policy actions that a government can commit in order to immediately 
address economic shocks.  This is unlike a situation where a country has its independent 
monetary policy. The government can immediately riposte an external economic shock by 
adjusting interest rates and changing foreign exchange parities than resort to much longer 
adjustments in prices and wages. In addition to foregoing independent monetary policy, a 
government also gets to give up income derived from printing money (seignorage). It will also be 
limited from being able to extensively use fiscal policy as a macroeconomic tool. 
 As was mentioned in earlier paragraphs, even though fiscal policy remains to be within 
the domain of individual states in a currency region, a government’s discretionary usage of fiscal 
guidelines is limited.  This is because a lax fiscal policy may engender the increase in interest 
rates by the central monetary authority to stem the outward flow of capital. 
 
16.  This goes back to the argument that no currency regime is appropriate for all countries at all times.   
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 In the short run time frame, the burden of adjustments towards a currency area usually 
befalls on the smaller and weaker economies.  Based from the experience of the European Union, 
a currency zone normally requires the pegging of rates on a nominal anchor currency, which, by 
convention, is the strongest and most stable currency in the area.17     This means that in order to 
comply with several accompanying convergence criteria (i.e. inflation rates, a cap on 
government budget expenditures, etc.), the transition phase may involve a rise in unemployment.  
This is if wages do not adjust in higher inflation countries.       
 The issue of the nature of economic shocks that a country is historically predisposed 
towards is another important factor to be considered.  There are usually 2 types of economic 
shocks that hit a country: an industry specific shock and a country specific shock.  The industry 
specific shock, granting that an economy is moderately diversified, will usually be effaced at a 
country level.  However, if shocks are country specific the central monetary authority may be 
forced to change the exchange rate levels in order to avoid a spillover of loss of confidence in the 
currency area.  Hence, if countries in an optimum currency area are subject to specific economic 
shocks, their economic cyclical positions may not be fully synchronized.  This may mean 
constant adjustment of monetary policy, which makes the credibility of the whole currency area 
suspect.     
 A hypothetical instance about the dangers of shocks is when members of a union are 
affected asynchronously.  Competitive pressures may build up towards the discontinuation of 
monetary and currency integration.  Such a scenario may occur once the central monetary 
authority fails to act resolutely to the needs of a country or group of countries (because of the 
size of the country/countries concerned, in relation to the overall size of the currency region) in 
order to address the stability of the entire currency area.  When this happens a societal clamor for 
the respective governments to act in the interests of their localities may occur.  In effect, the  
 
17.  The strongest and most stable ASEAN currency is the Singapore Dollar.  However, Singapore has constantly asserted its reservations abut 
being a nominal anchor currency because of the enormous responsibilities involved.   
 
 
 23
 
 
issue of currency unions becomes more critical after an integration of currencies.  This brings to 
fore the issue on the sustainability of a currency union.  
 In relation to the issue of shocks, empirical studies conducted by Engel and Rose (2000) 
and Frankel And Rose (1998 and 1996) revealed that business cycles are more tightly 
synchronized for countries that trade more with each other. Engel and Rose made their 
conclusions to contradict the theoretical approaches by Eichengreen (1992), Kenen (1969), and 
Krugman (1993) that closer trade integration results in countries having more asynchronous business 
cycles.  This is ascribed to the fact that Eichengreen and the others believed that closer trade would lead 
to economic relations according to specialized advantage.  Despite the empirical revelations, it is best to 
keep in mind the controversy of the issue. 
 
Lessons from the European Union 
 
Raison d’être 
 
 As the author mentioned in the introductory part of the paper, the experience of western Europe 
leading to the European Union has played a great role in captivating the minds of government policy 
makers, on various continents, to consider forging closer economic ties with other countries that may lead 
to eventual monetary and currency integration.  Hence, it goes without saying that the unfolding saga of 
the Euro, together with the developments in the E.U. to make the zone the most competitive economy in 
the world by 2010, is closely watched. 
 
 There are various accounts on the underlying machinations concerning the integration of 
economies in Western Europe.   Certain authors have attributed the main cause of the economic 
integration, purely to the trade benefits derived from having a larger market and to collectively 
reconstructing Western Europe’s economy.  Yet, there are others authors who narrated that the economic 
integration was meant to lay the bedrock for political integration. 
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 The strong assertion for eventual political union stems from some of the wordings of the 
Treaty of Rome (1958), wherein the agreement aimed to achieve an “ ever closer union among 
the European peoples”.  Believers of this concept went further to allege that economic 
integration was meant to be a means to ensure that neither France nor Germany (the 2 strongest 
countries on western continental Europe) invasively spread its dominance on the region at the 
expense of the other.  Some even went to say, that the union was meant to preclude another war 
(it must be recounted that the recent world wars emanated from Europe).              
 The 1958 Treaty of Rome specifically aimed to conceive the European Economic 
Community (EEC). Its primary purpose was to instigate the economic amalgamation between 
France, Germany, Italy, and the Benelux countries (Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands).  
The agreement took effect on 1 July 1968.  
 According to the paper of Vanthor (1998), by 1969 the 6 countries agreed that a viable 
way to materialize economic integration was through the formation of an Economic Monetary 
Union (EMU).  However, based on the Werner Report, this union was to be attained in stages, 
starting on 1 January 1971.  The Werner report indicated that in the final stage of the EMU, 
monetary and budgetary functions were to be transferred from the respective countries to a 
central authority. 
 The movement to the various stages of the EMU did not go unimpeded.  In the early 
1970s (which also saw the collapse of the Bretton Woods Agreement) a lack of coordination on 
economic and monetary policies ensued.  This impasse was finally abrogated when France and 
Germany established the European Monetary System (EMS) in 1978. 
 Vanthor described the EMS to be the “pulling power” of the European integration 
process.  The EMS revolved on the Exchange Rate Mechanism  (ERM).18   By 1989, the resolute 
steps towards one currency was sealed by concrete proposals for the Delors Report, which 
sought the realization of the EMU in 3 stages.  The Delors Report was also used as the 
predication towards the formation of the European Union (also known as the Maastricht Treaty). 
 
18.  The ERM was meant to highlight the centrifugal role of the European Currency Unit (ECU).  
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 The 3 stages of the Delors Report also did not proceed smoothly.  In the first stage (which 
started on 1 July 1990) of the EMU, the German unification threatened the parities of certain 
exchange rates.  This exacerbated to an extent wherein interest rates were increased, making the 
exchange rates of some countries overvalued. On August 1993, the currency band of the EMS 
was expanded from 2.25% to 15% on both sides of the central rate (with the exclusion of the 
German Mark and the Dutch Guilder).  Stage 2, which aimed to stabilize prices and promote 
solid public finances, was then implemented on 1994, along with the establishment of the 
European Monetary Institute (the precursor of the European Central Bank).  On the last stage, the 
European Central Bank issued the Euro on 1 January 1999. 
 
Convergence Criteria             
 Certain European countries, most especially Germany, were particularly concerned with 
the stability and the credibility of the Euro.  It was jointly decided that in order to assuage, and 
preempt foreseeable macroeconomic imbalances, a certain magnitude of economic convergence 
had to be achieved.  Since the German Mark was the paragon of European currency stability, it 
was made the nominal anchor for other concerned currencies.  This meant that other European 
countries had to adjust their policies to Germany, even though for some it was inconsistent with 
their national objectives.  
The Maastricht Treaty of 1993 gave specific conditions for countries that wished to 
participate in the unification of currencies. 5 economic factors were identified to be the value 
drivers behind a credible Euro (see table below).  In view of the convergence criteria, it must be 
accentuated that coutries were not easily able to comply with the stated requirements.   
In the paper of Vanthor (1998), it was cited that the government budgetary criteria was 
the hardest to comply with.  In fact, even the 2 biggest economies, France and Germany, 
experienced difficulty.  By 1997, the average public debt was still at 72.7 % of GDP when it  
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should have been at 60%.  This was also after the Pact for Stability Growth of 1995, wherein 
countries had to pursue sound public finances that were geared towards a balanced budget or 
surplus in the medium term.  The Pact also gave specific sanctions for non-compliance with the 
stated limits.   It consisted of non-interest bearing deposit between 0.02 and 0.05 % of GDP, 
applicable not only to members of EMU, but also to countries that planed to participate at a later 
date. 
 
Convergence Criteria of the Maastricht Treaty  
Inflation  1.5% above average of 3 countries with lowest inflation rates 
Long term Interest rates 2% above the average of 3 countries with the lowest long term rates  
Government deficit 3% of GDP or close to 3% of GDP 
Government debt 60% of GDP or a satisfactory reduction towards 60% GDP  
Exchange rate Within the normal “ER” for at least 2 years without devaluation on a country’s 
initiative   
Taken from the paper of W. Vanthor (1998) 
* Greece, the United Kingdom, and Sweden did not participate in the ERM 
** Exchange Rate Mechanism I comprised of a band on 2.25% on either side of the central rate. After the German unification, it was 
widened to 15%, with the exception of the Deutsche Mark and the Dutch Guilder       
               
    The over indulgence in fiscal discipline was meant to foster a certain level of monetary 
cooperation and behavior. A country’s budget deficit is ordinarily financed by the issuance of 
debt in the capital market.  In the case of EMU, the printing of money was strictly discouraged.  
If the deficit became too high, a country would not be able to finance it or it would be able to but 
at higher inflation rates, which was in contravention of another given requirement.    
  
Clamor for Political Union 
 
 Although this issue is considered diplomatically sensitive, some economists are insistent  
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that a currency union will only be sustainable in the long run if a political union is eventually 
realized.  Individual countries cannot indefinitely be given the discretion to plot their budgetary 
policies.  Much cognizance has already been given to the value of fiscal stability in maintaining 
monetary and price stability.  Hence, in the long run, a supra-national institution should also be 
in charge of formulating fiscal policies.  This may mean that the European Commission would be 
tasked with more responsibilities. 
 
Current Performance of the Euro  
 After much fanfare on the launching of the Euro last 01 January 1999, its performance 
has been rather mixed.  In the paper of Coppel (Coppel et al. 2000) the inflation rate has 
managed to stay within the prescribed limit.  There was also a decline in unemployment rate (the 
lowest in 7years).  However, the thorn of the issue has been its steady decline against the US 
Dollar.  Although other economists have rallied to the defense of the Euro by citing that it was 
never the original objective of the EMU to rival the Dollar, the developments still have 
microeconomic implications (like the steady outflow of capital, which could have been invested 
in the zone).  This has revived debates on how well foreign exchange markets reflect 
macroeconomic fundamentals. 
 One hypothesis behind the dismal performance of the Euro, in juxtapose wit the US 
Dollar, lies in the purview of structural rigidities.  It may be recalled that in Mundell’s original 
theory on the Optimum Currency Area emphasis was given on the need for free movement of 
capital, labor, products, services, and flexible prices.  In the case of the euro-zone, most of the 
cited variables still have to be emancipated. Despite the abolition of legal barriers, differences in 
cultural background, social pension schemes (which makes it difficult to compare different wage 
levels), and other work related regulations have discouraged labor migration.  As a result of labor  
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immobility, a demand shift will tend to increase unemployment in one region.  If wages are not 
that elastic, then the whole price structure of that certain region becomes rigid. 
 The free movement of capital has yet to be achieved.  Purported benefits that could be 
realized with the large- scale integration of capital markets lie in investors enjoying greater 
opportunities for the diversification of their portfolios.  Businessweek (15 January 2001) featured 
an article that depicted the eurozone as having 30 regulators and 20 stock exchanges.  This 
means that if a French company bids to list in Italy, the Italian rules will prevail.  Moreover, 
when the French, Netherlands, and Belgian stock markets merged last year to form Euronext, it 
only created one “corporate umbrella” for the separate markets. 
 As regards to previously cited debates on whether economic integration should precede 
currency integration or vice versa, current developments pertaining to the possible accession of 
Eastern European countries promise to shed light on the matter.  There is a crescendo on the 
moods of European economists to the need for a heightened level of economic integration prior 
to entry to EMU.  If their entry to the monetary union is precocious there will be a tendency for 
the said countries to experience above average inflation rates.  This is because eastern European 
countries will try to catch up with their western counterparts; wherein, higher inflation will be a 
result of increases in wages and productivity.  Such an assertion was likened to the case of 
Ireland and Spain, whose economies seem to be converging with the rest of European countries 
but at the expense of above average inflation rates.  Yet, if the European Central Bank relents to 
higher levels of inflation, it will be at the expense of its credibility. 
 In summary, the relatively sluggish pace in which structural reforms have proceeded may 
be one contributory factor to the performance of the Euro.  This may be due to investors’ 
circumspection on the rate of growth of the eurozone. However, more conclusive findings can be 
ascertained in the course of time. 
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Time Schedule for European Economic Integration with Inclusion of ASEAN Events 
 No tariffs & 
Quota on Intra-
trade 
Common 
External Tariff 
Free Movement 
of goods, 
services, and 
factors of 
production  
Harmonization 
of economic and 
monetary policy 
Centralization of 
Economic and 
Monetary policy 
Formation of 
Formal 
Groupings 
 
ASEAN 1967 *  
    
 
Free Trade Area 
 
EFTA 1960 
Common 
Effective 
Preferential 
Tariff Scheme of 
ASEAN (1962)* 
    
 
Customs Union  
  
EEC (1957 – 
1968) 
 
ASEAN Vision 
of 2020 (1997)* 
  
 
Common Market 
   
Single European 
Market (1986 – 
1993) 
 
ASEAN Vision 
2020 (1997) *  
 
EMS (1979 –
1999) 
 
 
Economic and 
Monetary Union   
     
EMU (1/1/99) 
Source : Healey (1995) from the Treaty of Rome to Maastricht , in N.M.(ed) the Economics of the New Europe, 
London:  Routledge 
* Not part of the original tableaux of Healey. Inserted by the author for a quick comparison of the two organizations.  ASEAN events and dates 
should only be interpreted from the horizontal axis, not applicable to the vertical axis.  This is except for ASEAN 2020 Vision.  
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Quantitative Analysis Segment   
 
Objectives: 
 
 The quantitative portion of this paper aims to determine whether the economic conditions 
in the countries of the south- east Asian region are currently in conformance with the optimum 
currency area theory and can somewhat fit into the criteria set by the European Monetary Union 
as a condition for entry into the single currency zone.  The underlying hypothesis here being, if 
the countries can somewhat be consistent with the aforementioned conditions then the idea of 
monetary union, with its numerous benefits, among south east Asian countries may not seem to 
be a far fetched idea. 
       
First Equation  
 
Log (Tij) = α + ß1 Log (GDPi GDPj) + ß2 Log (GDPi/ Popn.i  GDPj/ Popn. J) +ß3 Log (Distn.) 
+ ß4 (Adjacent) + γ (ASEAN) 
 
 
Pooled data set: 
Log (Tij) = α + ß1 Log (GDPi GDPj) + ß2 Log (GDPi/ Popn.i  GDPj/ Popn. J) +ß3 Log (Distn.) 
+ ß4 (Adjacent) + γ (ASEAN) + γ2 (ASEAN 1985-1980 periods) + γ3 (ASEAN 1990-1980 
periods) + γ3 (ASEAN 1995-1980 periods) + γ4 (ASEAN 1998-1980 periods) + λ1 (Period 
1985) + λ2 (Period 1990) + λ3 (Period 1995) + λ4 (Period 1998) 
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 The first equation is more popularly known as the Gravity Trade Model.  This model was 
taken from the papers of Jeffrey A. Frankel and Shang Jin Wei (1995) and the paper of Frankel 
(1992). 19   It was formulated to determine if trade is biased towards intra-regional partners within  
a trade bloc, in this case the south-east Asian trade bloc.   Nominal GDP is used. The countries 
used in the data set are the 10 ASEAN member countries, Australia, Papua New Guinea, 
Republic of Korea, Japan, China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong.  It may be observed that all countries 
concerned lie in the Asia Pacific Region.  All figures, except for the last two variables, which are 
binary, were taken from the IMF Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook (2000), the International 
Financial Statistics Yearbook (2000), and the National Geographic World Atlas. The time frame 
selected was a series of 5- year end periods from 1980 to 1999.                     
 Even though the paper of Jeffrey Frankel suggests that the more intense the trade 
relationship (or planned relations) between two countries the more beneficial it will be for the 
countries concerned to have a monetary integration, the main objective of this paper (with 
regards to the first equation) is to derive the effects of the residual γ in terms of its significance 
through the years.     
 
 
 
Second Equation  
 
% Δ local currency = α + β1  (%Δ US$)+β2 (%Δ of Yen) +β3 (%Δ of DM)+ β4 (%Δ Spre. $)+ ε         
          SWFr.                              SWFr.                SWFr.        SWFr.  SWFr.  
 
 
The objective of this equation, taken from the paper of Rose and Engel (2000), is to 
identify which countries in the ASEAN region tried to stabilize their country’s currency with that 
of the major international currencies.  In the aftermath of the Asian crisis, economists have  
19.  The gravity model was also used by Linneman (1966), Hammilton and Winters (1992), Eichengreen and Irwin, Rose and Engel (2000) 
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suggested at the possibility of countries adopting an explicit currency basket peg (weighted on 
the currencies of major trading partners) in order to arrive at a somewhat steady currency 
environment.  If a majority of countries are discovered to have similar weights on major 
international currencies, then the region’s economies can form a sort of monetary cooperation 
that may eventually lead to a currency union in the long run.  However, an important point to 
consider would be if too much weight is placed on one currency this may entail the volatility of 
the ASEAN currency against the movement of other residual major currencies.                 
The Singaporean Dollar is included in the equation because the IMF Direction of Trade 
Statistics 2000 indicates that Singapore has the most extensive regional trade presence of any 
ASEAN country.  Hence, it may be possible that its trading partners may have indirectly tried to 
stabilize their currencies with that of Singapore.  In turn, if Singapore’s currency is gauged to be 
relevant throughout the region, it can be a possible nominal anchor base.  
 All cited currencies are with reference to the Swiss Franc (due to its reputed stability). 
The data set is derived from the International Financial Statistics monthly nominal series of the 
1999 CD-Rom version.  The time span covered is from 1980 to 1998.  No data was available for 
Brunei and Vietnam.  Nominal exchange rates were used.     
 
Third Equation        
 
Corr (S) ij = α + β ASEAN + ε 
 
 The third equation, taken from the paper of Rose and Engel (2000), aims to identify the 
degree of similarity in economic disturbances that the countries in the region may have 
experienced.  The theory of optimum currency area asserts that countries that share similar 
economic shocks may have lower adjustment costs as to the conduct of independent monetary 
policy than countries that experience economic disturbances at varying periods.  Thus, the tighter  
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the correlation of concerned currencies, the higher the level of candidacy for the ASEAN 
optimum currency zone.  
 The data set is derived from the set of countries used in the first equation.  Annual real 
GDP (GDP/ GDP Deflator) was used.  
 
Application of the Convergence Criteria of the Maastricht Treaty on ASEAN Setting 
 
Inflation  
Log Δ (CPIi / CPIi-t)  
 1.5% above the average of 3 countries with the lowest inflation 
rate 
Government deficit  3% of GDP or close to 3% of GDP (nominal) 
Long term interest rate or 
thru use of 3 yr. average 
short term rates (due to 
term structure)   
 2% above the average of 3 countries with the lowest long term 
rates 
Government Debt 60% of nominal GDP or a satisfactory reduction towards 60% 
nominal GDP 
Exchange rate  Within the normal “ER” for at least 2 years without devaluation on 
a country’s initiative   
Taken from paper of W.  Vanthor (1998) 
• Greece, the United Kingdom, and Sweden did not participate in the ERM. 
• Exchange Rate Mechanism I comprised of a band on 2.25% on either side of the central rate. After the German unification, it was widened 
to 15%, with the exception of the Deutsche Mark and the Dutch Guilder.   
 
The use of the convergence criteria of the Maastricht treaty on the ASEAN setting 
evidently leads to the argument that the political and economic circumstances between the 
two geographic blocs are incongruous.  Hence, their inapplicability.  While this may be true, 
the author chose the said set of criteria as a rough gauge, and to support the aforecited 
equations, to see what degree of convergence, if any, exists among countries in the South-
East Asian region.           
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Findings on Quantitative Application  
Equation 1:  Gravity Model (1980) 
C GDP GDP/Cap ASEAN Adjacent Distance R-Sq. Adjusted 
R-sq. 
# of 
Observations
-11.099 
4.3204 
0.7738 
*** 
0.1055 
0.5326 
*** 
0.1041 
1.8695 
** 
0.7458 
-1.1653 
* 
0.6443 
 
-0.8795 
** 
0.3887 
0.6889 0.6491 45 
-18.365 
3.0357 
0.7651 
*** 
0.1107 
0.5418 
*** 
0.1093 
2.6929 
*** 
0.6837 
-1.1202 
0.6764 
 0.648 0.6128 45 
-18.848 
3.0856 
0.7677 
*** 
0.1131 
0.5651 
*** 
0.1107 
1.8958 
*** 
0.4967 
  0.6238 0.5963 45 
    
*      Significance Level of 0.10  Numbers on the first row indicate the size of the coefficient.  
**    Significance Level of 0.05  Numbers on the second row indicate the size of the standard error.  
*** Significance Level of 0.01  
 
 
 
Equation 1:  Gravity Model (1985) 
C GDP GDP/Cap ASEAN Adjacent Distance R-Sq. Adjusted 
R-sq. 
# of 
Observations
-5.1528 
3.1062 
0.6617 
*** 
0.077 
0.4776 
*** 
0.084 
0.7561 
0.6287 
-0.7311 
0.5699 
-1.2024 
*** 
0.2939 
0.7668 0.7372 44 
-14.676 
2.4364 
0.6475 
*** 
0.0911 
0.4670 
*** 
0.0994 
1.8595 
*** 
0.6728 
-0.6834 
0.6750 
 
 0.6654 0.6312 44 
-14.313 
2.4105 
0.6335 
*** 
0.0901 
0.4619 
*** 
0.0993 
1.3151 
*** 
0.4045 
  0.6567 0.631 44 
    
*      Significance Level of 0.10 
**    Significance Level of 0.05 
*** Significance Level of 0.01  
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Equation 1:  Gravity Model (1990) 
C GDP GDP/Cap ASEAN Adjacent Distance R-Sq. Adjusted 
R-sq. 
# of 
Observations
-6.7729 
3.7574 
0.7281 
*** 
0.1131 
0.1459 
0.0964 
0.851 
0.7146 
-0.5326 
0.7169 
-0.622 
0.4039 
0.4591 0.4253 86 
-11.422 
2.2562 
0.7127 
*** 
0.1136 
0.1354 
0.0971 
 
1.1968 
* 
0.6841 
-0.2089 
* 
0.6912 
 0.4431 0.4156 86 
-11.336 
2.2259 
0.7085 
*** 
0.1122 
0.1351 
.0965 
1.0686 
** 
0.5338 
  0.4425 0.4221 86 
    
*      Significance Level of 0.10 
**    Significance Level of 0.05 
*** Significance Level of 0.01  
 
 
 
 
Equation 1:  Gravity Model (1995) 
C GDP GDP/Cap ASEAN Adjacent Distance R-Sq. Adjusted 
R-sq. 
# of 
Observations
-10.369 
2.3860 
0.9067 
*** 
0.0788 
0.157 
** 
0.07 
1.4445 
*** 
0.5074 
0.3617 
0.4854 
-0.7350 
*** 
0.2307 
0.7305 0.7225 81 
-15.723 
1.793 
0.8879 
*** 
0.0831 
0.1408 
* 
0.0736 
1.826 
*** 
0.523 
0.6748 
0.5032 
 0.6940 0.6779 81 
-15.786 
1.8016 
0.898 
*** 
0.0832 
0.1322 
* 
0.0737 
2.277 
*** 
0.4012 
  0.6868 0.6746 81 
    
*      Significance Level of 0.10 
**    Significance Level of 0.05 
*** Significance Level of 0.01  
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Equation 1:  Gravity Model (1998) 
C GDP GDP/Cap ASEAN Adjacent Distance R-Sq. Adjusted 
R-sq. 
# of 
Observations
-14.11 0.887 
*** 
0.1217 
0.4001 
*** 
0.1386 
1.04787 
0.6678 
1.1368 
0.6941 
-0.7026 
* 
0.3946 
0.8897 0.8572 
 
23 
-20.322 0.9557 
*** 
0.1222 
0.3222 
** 
0.1393 
1.2872 
* 
0.6924 
1.4399 
* 
0.7122 
 0.8691 0.84 23 
-21.020 1.0139 
*** 
0.128 
0.2813 
* 
0.1486 
2.1378 
*** 
0.5929 
  0.8394 0.814 23 
    
*      Significance Level of 0.10 
**    Significance Level of 0.05 
*** Significance Level of 0.01  
 
 
 
 
Equation 1:  Gravity Model (1980 - 98) 
C GDP GDP/Cap ASEAN Adjacent Distance R-Sq. Adjusted 
R-sq. 
# of 
Observations
-12.238 
2.351 
0.8808 
*** 
0.068 
0.2635 
*** 
0.0593 
1.49868 
*** 
0.40819 
-0.2885 
0.3786 
-0.5963 
** 
0.2404 
0.5894 0.57667 167 
         
         
    
*      Significance Level of 0.10 
**    Significance Level of 0.05 
*** Significance Level of 0.01  
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Observations on the First Equation  
 
 At the 5-year end periods of 1980 and 1985 the ASEAN predictor, is found to be 
significant (using a p-value of either 0.01 or 0.05).  However, it must be noted that in 1985 only 
after removing the variable on distance did the ASEAN predictor become significant. Aside 
from the significance of the ASEAN predictor on both time periods, the size of the coefficients 
(1980 = 2.6929, 1985 = 1.8595) attest to the importance intra-regional trade). 
 The 1990 end year period showed a diminishment in the size of the coefficient and the 
level of significance of the ASEAN variable.  Only after the variables of “adjacency” and 
“distance” were discounted did the ASEAN predictor become significant.   
 It is also interesting to note that the adjusted R-square was drastically reduced when 
compared to the previous five-year end periods (1980 = 0.6491, 1985=0.6312, 1990 = 0.4156).  
Closer examination of the trade policies of ASEAN countries at that time may reveal that the 
countries concerned concentrated on increased national output for exports to countries outside 
the region.     
 By 1995, the ASEAN predictor regained its relevance.  This time, even with the presence 
of the distance variable (which is also statistically significant), the ASEAN predictor was 
significant to a level of p-value equal to 0.01.  The adjusted R-square also increased to 0.7225.  
This is also the period when the ASEAN group of countries was conceptualizing the ASEAN 
2020 Vision for a more unified region (later ratified in 1997).        
 The 1998 figures are slightly inconclusive as the number of observations were only 23, 
and the period observed was immediately after the outburst of the Asian crisis.  Nevertheless, 
after removing the variables of distance and adjacency, the ASEAN predictor became significant 
to a p-value of 0.01.   
 In terms of the pooled data set, the ASEAN predictor proved to be statistically significant 
to a p-value of 0.01. This was even in the presence of the variables for adjacency and distance.       
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Equation 2 Currency Regression Model   
 
Compiled Results of Currency Regression 
ASEAN 
Currency 
DM Yen S’pore 
$ 
US $ Adjusted 
R-sqre 
 
# of 
Observations 
Time 
Duration
Cambodia -0.978 
1.0233 
0.145 
0.3566 
0.165 
0.6459 
1.502 
*** 
0.5581 
0.222 83 1992-98 
Indonesia -0.009 
0.035 
-0.458 
** 
0.2271 
4.257 
*** 
0.4691 
-2.257 
*** 
0.3586 
0.3222 227 1980-98 
Laos 0.028 
0.1285 
-0.238 
0.8342 
1.364 
1.7234 
0.158 
1.3175 
0.0027 227 1980-98 
Malaysia -0.005 
0.0093 
-0.0136 
0.0605 
1.319 
*** 
0.1250 
-0.182 
* 
0.0956 
0.6985 227 1980-98 
Myanmar 0.007* 
0.0044 
0.181 
*** 
0.0285 
0.009 
0.059 
0.514 
*** 
0.0451 
0.8185 227 1980-98 
Philippines -0.001 
0.0143 
-0.189 
** 
0.0926 
1.023 
*** 
0.1914 
0.379 
*** 
0.1463 
0.5921 227 1980-98 
Singapore 4.019E-07
4.951E-6 
1.8969E-
06 
3.2138E-5 
0.9998 
6.639E-5 
0.0001 
** 
5.0756E5 
0.999 227 1980-98 
Thailand -0.003 
0.0115 
-0.059 
0.0748 
1.445 
*** 
0.1545 
-0.212 
* 
0.1181 
0.6307 227 1980-98 
Data derived from International Financial Statistics, Monthly Data (1999 CD Rom Version):  figures for Brunei and 
Vietnam were not provided. Nominal exchange rates were used. 
  *      Significance Level of 0.10  Numbers on the first row indicate the size of the coefficient. 
**     Significance Level of 0.05  Numbers on the second row indicate the size of the standard error. 
***  Significance Level of 0.01 
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Observations on the Second Equation 
 
 The majority of the ASEAN countries, 7 out of 10, seem to have implicitly or explicitly 
stabilized their national currencies to the US $, most probably due to export oriented policies 
that mainly focused on the USA as a major market.  
 A more revealing statistical result is that the largest economies in ASEAN (i.e. Malaysia, 
Indonesia, Philippines, and Thailand) also seem to have stabilized their respective currencies to 
the Singapore $.  This statistical fact may be supported by data in the IMF – Direction of Trade 
Statistics Yearbook 2000, which indicates that Singapore has the largest trade presence of all 
ASEAN countries within the Southeast Asian region.      
 It is also interesting to note that although the Singapore Dollar is statistically significant 
to the US $ (within a p-value of 0.01), the size of its coefficient is nearly negligible (0.0001). 
 The established association of the major ASEAN economies with the Singapore $, plus 
the Singapore government’s thrust to rely on outward economic expansion to increase its growth 
level, may serve to make the Singapore currency a nominal anchor, similar to the German 
Deutsche Mark, should monetary integration be seriously contemplated.      
 
 
 
Third Equation: Regression on Economic Disturbance Model  
 
 
C ASEAN Adjusted R-Sqre # of Observations 
0.8918 
*** 
0.02806 
-0.05235 
0.04861 
0.003 54 
Figures taken from 1999 IMF – International Financial Statistics CD-Rom (yearly real GDP figures from 1980-
1999)     
Countries excluded due to lack of reliable data:  Brunei, Cambodia, Vietnam 
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Observations on the Third Equation    
 
 The result of the third equation clearly indicates the insignificance of ASEAN as a 
predictor of the correlation of real GDP among countries.  Coined in another way, ASEAN 
countries do not experience economic disturbances at the same time. This is a very relevant 
observation because it entails higher adjustments costs (in terms of monetary and fiscal policies) 
should the countries in the region decide to come up with a unified monetary policy. 
 The insignificance of the ASEAN variable can also be partly due to the varied stages of 
economic development of countries within the region.  Some countries are largely dependent on 
agricultural products, which is susceptible to the weather and volatile world commodity prices, 
while other economies are largely reliant on the manufacturing and services sectors (in turn they 
are affected by a different set of economic cycles).   
 
Application of Convergence Criteria of the Maastricht Treaty   
Periodic Averages of Inflation Rate Figures (Table A)  
Country 1971-76 1977-82 1983-88 1989-94 1995-99 
Brunei    0.02 0.02 
Cambodia     0.07 
Indonesia 0.2 0.13 0.08 0.08 .2 
Laos     0.13 
Malaysia 0.07 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.04 
Myanmar 0.19 0.01 0.11 0.26 0.28 
Philippines 0.16 0.13 015 0.11 0.08 
Singapore 0.08 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.01 
Thailand 0.09 0.11 0.03 0.05 0.05 
Viet Nam    0.07 0.07 
Average 0.13 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.10 
Figures of Brunei and Laos were taken from U.N. Statistical Yearbook for Asia and the Pacific2000. Figures for Viet Nam were taken from Viet 
Nam General Statistics Office.  All other figures of remaining countries were taken from IMF-IFS Yearbook 2000. 
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Long Term Interest Rates  (Table B)   
 ‘85 ‘86 ‘87 ‘88 ‘89 ‘90 ‘91 ‘92 ‘93 ‘94 ‘95 ‘96 ‘97 ‘98 ‘99 
Brunei                
C’bodia                
Laos                
Indon.*   8.28 9.84 14.03 13.85 13.82 13.62 11.85 10.13 10.68 12.45 18.47 34.86 38.06 
M’sia**   3.85 3.43 3.82 4.97 6.23 7.02 7.14 5.94 5.22 5.2 6.11 6.56 5.6 
Mynmar          10.5 10.5 13.13 14 14  
Phil.* 23.16 23.79 18.11 14.09 14.94 19.00 21.36 20.48 16.74 13.73 12.31 12.27 12.33 13.41 12.633.9
S’pore*   4.51 4.15 4.51 5.42 5.57 4.7 3.33 2.97 2.91 3.06 3.28 4.09 6.693.8 
Thail. 12.11 9.11 7.48 7.5 8.09 10.6 10.75 10.75 10.75 10.75 10.75 10.75 10.75 10.25 6.69 
Viet 
Nam 
               
* Computed from 3 year average money market rates. 
** Computed from 3 year average T-bill rates. 
Figures are derived from  IMF-IFS Yearbook 2000 
 
 
 
 
Government Deficits as %age of GDP (Table C)  
Country ‘88 ‘89 ‘90 ‘91 ‘92 ‘93 ‘94 ‘95 ‘96 ‘97 ‘98 
Brunei            
Cambodia            
Indon. -2.94 -1.87 0.38 0.39 -0.39 0.61 0.94 2.22 1.16 -0.67 -1.79 
M’sia -3.56 -3.24 -2.89 -1.95 -0.82 0.21 2.26 0.84 0.72 2.35 -1.76 
Myanmar -3.02 -4.16 -5.13 -48.14 -2.83 -2.15 -3.33 -4.12 -3.16 -17.11 0.51 
Phil. -2.91 -2.11 -3.45 -2.11 -1.18 -1.48 1.07 0.58 0.29 0.06 -1.87 
S’pore 6.19 1.18 9.77 10.27 11.93 13.96 14.88 15.96 10.57 16.49 10.52 
Thailand 2.31 3.52 4.9 4.01 2.54 1.74 2.81 3.3 0.94 -0.32 -2.55 
Viet Nam            
Average 0.65 -1.11 0.60 -6.26 1.54 2.15 3.10 3.13 1.75 0.13 0.51 
Figures derived from IMF-IFS yearbook 2000 
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Outstanding Government Debt as %age of GDP (Table D) 
Country  ‘88 ‘89 ‘90 ‘91 ‘92 ‘93 ‘94 ‘95 ‘96 ‘97 
Brunei           
Cambodia           
Indon.  43.71 42.43 36.65 39.3 37.5 36.05 30.82 23.92  
M’sia 2.49 4.93 6.54 6.66 4.68 4.51 8.06 11.2 9.87 3.67 
Myanmar 1.845 3.415 4.170 3.606 1.958 1.642 2.606 3.147 2.238  
Phil. 53.29 49.72 51.30 49.7 52.77 67.13 56.42 61.06 53.19 55.78 
S’pore 84.11 81.53 82.57 83.89 86.96 76.65 74.15 76.64 76.72 75.53 
Thailand 27.73 21.69 15.34 12.29 9.44 6.57 5.4 4.16 4.74 10.02 
Viet Nam           
Figures derived from Government Finance Statistics Yearbook, IMF, 2000 
Outstanding Debt (Domestic + Foreign Debts); consolidated central government (end of fiscal year) 
 
 
 
Periodic Standard Deviation of Exchange Rates  (Table E) 
Country ’70-75 ’76-80 ’81-85 ’86-90 ’91-95 ’96-99 
Brunei     0.17 0.10 0.17 
Cambodia     954.95 587.59 
Indonesia 21.51 110.68 214.46 216.66 115.28 3754.46 
Laos * 184.45 181.62 11.92 259.57 38.34 2839.07 
Malaysia 0.32 0.16 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.7 
Myanmar 0.63 0.21 0.48 0.39 0.23 0.29 
Philippines 0.45 0.06 4.84 1.59 0.86 7.18 
Singapore 0.32 0.15 0.04 0.14 0.12 0.14 
Thailand 0.21 0.05 2.03 0.37 0.23 1565.66 
Viet Nam      460.34 1565.66 
US $ 0.1 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.04 
Yen 35.01 36.76 10.24 14.89 16.83 9.59 
DM 0.51 0.31 0.29 0.21 0.09 0.38 
* There was a revaluation in 1980. 
Figures taken from IMF-IFS Statistical Yearbook 2000 
Figures for Brunei and Viet Nam are taken from UN Statistical Yearbook for Asia and the Pacific  
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Observations based on the Maastricht Treaty as a Benchmark 
 
 It must be stressed that the usage of macroeconomic indicators embodied in the 
Maastricht Treaty as a benchmark for ASEAN monetary integration may solicit several 
criticisms on its applicability to the ASEAN situation due to different political and economic 
settings.  However, the purpose of this exercise is to gauge, offhand, whether ASEAN countries, 
in their current economic form, can comply with the stringent European criteria.       
 As regards to the inflation figures in table A, the countries in the regions do not have a 
history of serious inflationary problems (with the exception of Myanmar).  This may be an 
indication of disciplined monetary policy operations being undertaken by the respective central 
banks.        
 On the criterion of long-term interest rates (table B), there seems to be a bifurcation in the 
trend lines of countries concerned. An upward trend in interest rates includes: Indonesia, 
Malaysia, and Singapore (as compared to the rest of the ASEAN countries, which are on a 
downward trend).   This indicates expectations of inflation in the future, possibly deduced from 
interpretations of the respective governments’ economic policy announcements.       
 It is important for the long-term rates of countries concerned to be on the same trend line.  
This is because a unified monetary union, leading to a single currency, will severely constrain 
the manner in which countries can fine- tune their national economies.    
 Tables C and D show that, historically, the ASEAN countries have managed their fiscal 
spending.  No ASEAN country has neither yearly deficits greater than 3% of its GDP nor, with 
the exception of Singapore, has breached the 60% of GDP outstanding government debt (the 
Philippines seems to be approaching that level). 
 For Singapore, its relatively high outstanding government debt as a percentage of GDP 
(1997 = 75.53 %) is seen as a marked improvement from its all time high of 86.96% in 1992.  
The decreasing trend in its budget surplus (1998 = 10.52% of GDP) and the corresponding  
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decrease in government debt as a percent of GDP strongly indicate that the government is 
gradually paying off its debts with its surplus earnings.   
          High volatility in currency movements implies constancy in which governments 
have to adjust macroeconomic policies in order to arrive at an equilibrium point for its internal 
and external economic environments.   Countries that have very volatile exchange rates may 
need to possess maximum leeway in the use of macroeconomic tools to fine-tune their 
economies.  
Table E shows that Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Philippines, Thailand, and Viet Nam 
have volatile exchange rates.  This has to be addressed before any serious thought of monetary 
integration can be addressed.  Otherwise, it would lead to unbalanced growth within the region 
and constant pressure on the supra-national central bank to adjust monetary policy. Thereby, 
putting its credibility into question.       
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Conclusion  
 
        The query into the unification of currencies in the South East Asian region is primarily 
related to a search for ways and means to supplement the efforts of the 10 governments to arrive 
at a more integrated political, economic, and outward looking regional bloc.  One of the major 
advantages cited by the optimum currency area lies in the further expansion of intra-regional 
trade as a result of free movement of factors of production, lessened transaction costs, and 
transparency in economic processes and institutions; thereby, boosting investor confidence. 
         The various data that were tested, analyzed, and inferred point to varied conclusions as to 
conformance to the tenets of the optimum currency area. Needless to say, it must be recalled that 
there is a bifurcation in the theory itself.  One school of thought insists that prior to monetary 
integration, leading to currency union, there must be general economic integration.  Otherwise, 
the whole region might be burdened by economic and social tensions arising from a mismatch in 
regional macroeconomic policies with that of country specific policy remedial courses of action. 
         The other school of thought asserts that regardless of the ex ante macroeconomic fit of 
countries in an optimum currency area, a closer economic and monetary integration should 
eventually lead to economic convergence.   
        Through the years the level of intra- ASEAN trade has increased and remained statistically 
significant.  Despite current evidence that clearly point to non-similarity in economic 
disturbances, in theory, closer trade is supposed to result in countries specializing in the 
production of goods and rendition of services wherein they have comparative advantages.  This 
should eventually lead to tighter correlation in business cycles, thereby; satisfying the condition 
 
 in the currency theory that regions should have similar economic disturbances in order to 
minimize adjustment costs that each country will have to bear. 
       With regard to benchmarking to the Maastricht Treaty (which may eventually be politically  
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and economically incorrect for the region) data indicate that South East Asian countries do not 
have the historical burden of excessive inflation and fiscal overspending.  This can prove to be 
confidence building barometers should the region decide to seriously pursue monetary, leading 
to currency, unification.   
       One factor that needs to be seriously addressed is the seemingly volatile movement of 
exchange rates for most of the countries in the region.  The theory on one currency area entails 
that the countries’ recourse to adjustment of their currencies in order to maintain near 
equilibrium between internal and external macroeconomic environments would be severely 
constrained when a central monetary authority dictates interest rates for the entire region.      
     The reasons for currency volatility of countries in the South East Asian region were not 
examined in this study. However, an initial hypothesis points to export competitiveness to major 
markets outside the region.  Should currency union come into effect, the transformation of trade, 
both within and outside the region, would lead to production and rendition of services based on 
comparative advantages – which lessens the pressure for export competitiveness.               
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Appendix 
 
 
Exchange Rate Regimes of ASEAN Countries 
Country Exchange Rate Regime Monetary Policy Framework 
 
Brunei 
Darussalam 
* Currency Board Arrangement 
**  Pegged to the Singapore $ 
* Exchange Rate Anchor 
Cambodia *Managed with no pre-announced path for exchange rate 
 ** Managed floating 
* Adopts more than one nominal 
anchor in conduct of monetary policy 
Indonesia * Independently floating 
** Managed floating 
* Other monetary program 
Laos PDR *Managed floating with no pre-announced 
path for exchange rate  
** Managed floating 
* Uses various indicators in conduct 
of monetary policy 
Malaysia *Other conventional fixed peg 
arrangements 
 ** Managed floating 
* Exchange rate anchor 
Myanmar *Other conventional fixed peg arrangements 
(against a composite of currencies) 
 
 ** Pegged to SDR 
 
* Exchange rate anchors  
Philippines *Independently floating  
     ** independent floating 
* Adopts more than one nominal 
anchor in conducting monetary 
policy 
Singapore *Managed floating with no pre-announced path for 
exchange rate 
** Managed floating 
* Other monetary policy framework 
Thailand *Independently floating  
    ** Pegged to a basket of currencies other than 
SDR 
* Other monetary program 
Viet Nam * Pegged Exchanger Rate within horizontal bands 
** Managed floating 
* Exchange rate anchor (has a de 
facto arrangement under a formally 
announced policy of managed or 
independent floating) 
 Source:  International Financial Statistics Yearbook  
* As of March 31,2000  
** As of March 31,1997 
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Chronological Order of Salient ASEAN Events 
(in relation to possible currency unification) 
 
Date Agreement Summary 
 
 
1. August 
8,1967 
 
 
 
 
 
2. 24 Feb.   
1976  
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. 13-15 
Dec., 
1987 
 
 
4. 28 Jan.  
1992 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   5.  15 Dec. 1995 
 
6. 15 Dec.  
1997 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. ASEAN Declaration 
(Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Singapore, Thailand) 
 
 
 
 
2. Declaration of ASEAN 
Concord 
(Malaysia, Philippines, 
Singapore and Thailand) 
 
 
 
 
 
3. 3rd Summit Meeting of 
Heads of Government 
 
 
       4.  Common Effective 
Preferential Tariff Scheme (CEPT) 
(Brunei, Indonesia, 
Philippines, Singapore, 
Malaysia, Thailand) 
 
 
 
 
5. Amendment to the CEPT 
Scheme 
 
      6.   ASEAN 2020 Vision  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Need to strengthen regional solidarity and 
cooperation, which is aimed to contribute 
towards the development of peace, progress and 
prosperity in the region; the association was 
open to all states in the SEA region 
 
2. Agreement to pursue political stability of each 
country and the entire region; also an 
affirmation to take cooperative action in 
national and regional development and to 
broaden the complementation of each economy; 
also an agreement to develop an awareness of a 
regional identity     
 
3. Agreement to strengthen intra-ASEAN 
cooperation to realize the region’s potential I 
trade and development  
 
 
4. Preferential trading arrangement will serve as a 
stimulus to the strengthening of national and 
ASEAN economic resilience; the agreed tariff 
system encompassed all manufactured items 
with a local component of at least 40%; cited a 
graduated schedule for preferential tariff 
reductions to within 0-5% 
 
5. Amended to include capital goods and 
agricultural products 
 
6. By 2020, the entire South East Asian Region 
will have a common regional identity; sought 
the realization of a stable, prosperous and 
highly competitive ASEAN economic region  
 
- gave emphasis on the attainment of 
free flow of  goods, services, 
investments, capital, equitable 
economic development and reduction 
of poverty 
- envisioned the integration of the  
financial sector,  free flow of 
professional services and the 
establishment of regional information 
technology network 
- avowed the interconnection of 
arrangements  in the field of energy 
and integration of transportation 
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  7.  1998 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7. Hanoi Plan of Action 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
network, promotion of a customs 
partnership to promote trade and 
investment 
- to realize an outward looking ASEAN 
 
7. Initiated a series of action plans to concretize 
the Vision of 2020; emphasis was given on: 
- Maintenance of regional 
macroeconomic and financial stability  
- Orderly capital account liberalization 
(with facilitation in cross border 
capital flows) 
- Cooperation in money, tax and 
insurance matters 
- Enhanced role of the private sector 
- Development and integration of 
ASEAN’s capital markets (also 
includes the cross listing of SMEs)   
- Enhanced economic integration 
- Customs harmonization 
- Sustainable attractiveness of the 
region to foreign direct investments 
through ASEAN Investment Area 
- Promotion of free flow of capital, 
labor and technology within the 
region  
- Removal of transportation, travel and 
telecommunications barriers 
- Joint development of infrastructure 
facilities  
- Insurance of regional food and 
security arrangements 
- Joint development and adoption of 
new technologies 
- Enhanced regional cooperation in 
international and regional issues 
- Foster of SMEs and adoption of best 
practices  
- Intellectual property cooperation  
- Expedition of the implementation of 
the various economic growth areas 
(BIMP, IMS-GT, IMT-GT, E-W 
Mekong Basin, Mekong Basin 
development Cooperation) 
- Promotion and protection of the 
environment 
- Promotion of ASEAN’s standing in 
the international community  
 
8. The adoption of a proactive role at various 
international and regional for a in any endeavor 
towards the reform of international financial 
architecture to ensure efficiency and stability of 
financial markets 
 
9. Concord on an e-ASEAN framework as a step 
to place ASEAN into digital readiness; to 
facilitate interconnectivity and technical 
interoperability to foster growth in e-commerce 
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8. 30 April 
1999 
 
 
 
 
 
      9. 22- 25 Nov. 
2000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8. Common ASEAN Position 
on Reforming the 
International Financial 
Architecture  
 
 
 
   9.  ASEAN Informal Summit 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- to  narrow the divide within ASEAN and 
enhance its competitiveness as a region   
 
-   further affirmed its declaration to develop a 
common market place for trade, human 
resource development and e- governance  
 
 
Sources:  original texts of the aforesaid agreements from ASEAN web site ( www.asean.or ) 
BIMP refers to Brunei –Indonesia-Malaysia –Philippines East Asian growth Area, IMS-GT refers to Indonesia-Malaysia-Singapore Growth 
Triangle, IMT-GT refers to Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand Growth Triangle, West –East corridor of Mekong Basin covers Vietnam, Laos and 
Cambodia, Mekong Basin Development Cooperation Scheme covers North and eastern side of Thailand   
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